Why the US Cares About Somalia
Geopolitical Futures
Wednesday May 10, 2017
Wednesday May 10, 2017
Something is quietly
stirring in the Horn of Africa. Over the past month, the United States seems to
have shown a renewed interest in Somalia and the security threats that emanate
from it. On April 15, U.S. Africa Command confirmed that several dozen troops
from the 101st Airborne Division would train and equip Somali forces to more
effectively combat militant Islamist group al-Shabab.
Shortly thereafter, U.S. President Donald Trump signed an
executive order giving AFRICOM more autonomy in its missions against the group.
Then, on May 5, Washington announced the death of a U.S. Navy SEAL outside the
capital of Mogadishu – and, in doing so, acknowledged that the United States
was participating in local military operations there. U.S. Secretary of Defense
James Mattis is even slated to attend a conference in the United Kingdom on May
11 over the future of Somalia.
These events raise an obvious and important question: Why does
Somalia warrant such a military commitment from the world’s only superpower?
The answer to that question, as is so often the case, starts with
geography. Somalia’s northern coast borders the Gulf of Aden, which leads to
Bab el-Mandeb, a narrow chokepoint through which all maritime traffic from the
Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean must pass. Avoiding this strait would
take all goods from the Persian Gulf – including oil – around the entire
African continent to reach European and American markets. It is also a valuable
staging ground for navies to project power on to the Arabian Peninsula.
For this reason, Washington’s interest in Somalia remained
steadfast even after the Cold War ended. After civil war erupted in 1991, the
United States, in a testament to Somalia’s geostrategic importance,
participated heavily in the U.N. peacekeeping mission there. (Washington would
later reduce its involvement after sustaining casualties in 1993.) Among the
groups fighting for power were Islamist groups, one of which, the Islamic Courts
Union, actually controlled southern Somalia in the 2000s.
An extremist wing of the Islamic Courts Union split from its
parent group, donned the name al-Shabab, and continues to conduct terrorist
attacks in the country. Al-Shabab also boasts ties with both al-Qaida and the
Islamic State group. Formally, Somalia now has a central government, but it
cannot control formally or informally such an untamed and fractured country, to
which al-Shabab is a big contributor.
The United States, meanwhile, has been coming to terms with the
costs of global hegemony. It has been trying to extricate itself from faraway
military operations such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Horn of Africa
is no different. Washington understands that it does not have the resources or
political capital to fight every war in the world. But it still needs to be
active in places like Somalia to protect its global interests. It has therefore
pursued a strategy that involves a limited use of resources necessary to
achieve an acceptable result as opposed to decisive, clear-cut victory.
Such is the case in
Somalia. Over the past few years, Washington has selectively developed a
military presence throughout the Horn of Africa that features drone technology,
special operations forces and cooperation with other regional actors.
The East Africa Response Force, an outfit comprising members of
the U.S. Air Force, Marines and Navy tasked with crisis response and personnel
recovery, returned to Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti (the largest U.S. base in
Africa) in April 2014.
Plans are also underway to add new facilities to the U.S. special
operations compound at Lemonnier. In addition, U.S. 3rd Special Forces Group
were sent back to Africa in late 2015 after serving in Afghanistan. The U.S.
government was also privy to the negotiations for DP World’s plans to develop
Berbera port in Somaliland along the Gulf of Aden, as well as plans by the
United Arab Emirates (a strong U.S. ally) to establish a military base near
there.
Central to this strategy, however, is the inclusion of local
forces to share security responsibilities. To that end, the United States has
been delegating to regional leaders who have a more vested interest in
stabilizing the internal conflicts and terrorist threats coming out of other
countries. Given their shared border with Somalia, not to mention their
comparatively mature militaries, Ethiopia and Kenya appear as the two most
natural candidates.
Ethiopia, however, is undergoing a period of nationwide unrest and
is not in a position to be a viable partner. The country recalled some of its
troops from Somalia citing financial restrictions, but the more likely
explanation is that more security forces were needed to help quell domestic
political unrest.
Kenya appears to be more reliable. The country has a direct
incentive to help, considering al-Shabab has conducted attacks on Kenyan soil.
Recent U.S. gestures to help Kenya play its regional role include increased
military training programs, inclusion in regional military drills, and the sale
of 12 new U.S.-made light attack helicopters, 24 heavy machine gun pods and
accompanying systems, 24 rocket pods and some 4,000 M151 high-explosive
rockets. With so much time spent fighting insurgencies, moreover, the United
States has a lot of experience it can impart to Kenya that it cannot get from
other countries.
There may also be economic motivation to helping the United
States. Kenya is an emerging East African economy, and its main strategy for
increasing basic manufactured exports is to take advantage of the United
States’ African Growth and Opportunity Act, which gives Kenya preferential
trade status with the United States.
For this reason, in late April, the Kenyan government sent Foreign
Affairs Cabinet Secretary Amina Mohamed to Washington to discuss security
cooperation, economic agreements and investment opportunities with U.S.
officials.
Ideally, the United States would like to see al-Shabab, and indeed
all radical Islam, destroyed. But to achieve this requires the United States to
use vast resources for results that are far from guaranteed. Instead, the
United States will settle for keeping the world’s sea lanes off the Horn of
Africa open and safe for passage.
This is the U.S. imperative in the region, and a containment
approach to al-Shabab in Somalia achieves that goal, particularly since the
group is relegated largely to the south, separated from the strategic north by
vast deserts and poor transportation infrastructure. The United States will try
to use its allies to help it keep al-Shabab there, a sufficient outcome for a
country trying to strike a balance of power in virtually every corner of the
world.
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