Somalia: Transforming Hope into Stability - ICG Commentary
Tuesday May 2, 2017
Somalia has a genuine
opportunity to promote needed political and security reforms following the
election of a new president and renewed international interest. In this excerpt
from the Watch List 2017 –
First Update early-warning report for European policy makers,
Crisis Group urges the European Union to seize the momentum by achieving
consensus with its international partners on realistic goals ahead of the
upcoming London Conference on Somalia in May.
This commentary is part of our Watch List 2017 –
First Update.
Somalia is at a tipping point. The election of
a new president with cross-clan support, the emergence of a youthful and
reform-minded parliament, and renewed international interest present a genuine
opportunity to promote needed political and security reforms to combat
Al-Shabaab and stabilise more areas. The London Conference on Somalia in May
coincides with this moment and should be seized upon to mobilise international
support. However, because the new federal cabinet was only approved in early
March, conference organisers should be realistic about how detailed the
government’s plans can or should be. More broadly, key international actors –
the European Union (EU), African Union, Arab League, UK, Turkey and the U.S. –
will need to coordinate and achieve consensus on realistic strategic goals, including
creating an environment in which the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
can begin to draw down. If the new president fails to deliver on promised key
reforms – including to rebuild the national army, revamp the constitution, curb
corruption and strengthen federalism – both domestic and external support for
the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) will inevitably wane and Al-Shabaab
will be in a stronger position to rebuild its forces and support.
Al-Shabaab exploits humanitarian needs
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Although international
aid has picked up, its geographic coverage remains limited, not least because
insecurity is rampant and the UN has so far managed to raise only 30 per cent
of the $825 million it asked for in early March. As a result, the threat of
famine is unlikely to diminish in the next six to twelve months and 5.5 million
people (nearly half the population) will require emergency aid. The immediate
priority is to mobilise more funds, prevent a repeat of the large-scale graft
that marred past relief efforts and assist the hardest hit communities in
remote regions which are increasingly turning to Al-Shabaab for assistance.
Al-Shabaab is exploiting these needs to improve its image and attract public
support, allowing people to move to relief centres run by local and
international agencies, even as it gives no indication of its willingness to
grant aid agencies access to areas it controls.
Al-Shabaab struggles to demonise diaspora
Somalis’ crowd-funding campaign (collecting small amounts of money from a large
number of people) and especially the Caawi Walaal campaign
organised by youth volunteers to provide water and food to remote villages.
International actors should therefore support such initiatives, given their
potential to extend the reach of the relief effort to remote areas inaccessible
to Western aid agencies.
Harnessing the diaspora
The recent elections produced Somalia’s most
demographically diverse and youthful parliament ever. Nearly half its 283
members are younger than 50; over 90 hail from the diaspora; and 63 are female.
President Mohammed Abdullahi Farmajo campaigned on reform and owes his victory
to younger and well-educated diaspora MPs. However, efforts to push through
needed reforms and national reconciliation will be complicated by the poor
delineation of roles and authorities among the president, prime minister and
speakers of the upper and lower houses, as well as by powerful vested interests
that will want to maintain the 4.5 formula that apportions FGS positions among
the four major and smaller minority clans. The president will not be able to
rely solely on the diaspora bloc but will need to work with politicians more
closely tied to the traditional clan leadership. In the same vein, the new
administration will need to avoid giving too many positions to diaspora
Somalis, which could aggravate deep societal divisions.
Economic regeneration (symbolised by upmarket
hotels, restaurants and homes in Mogadishu) is largely underwritten by
remittances from some two million diaspora Somalis, worth some $1.4 billion
each year. The FGS has held meetings to mobilise more effective diaspora
support for reconstruction, yet there is neither an agency entrusted with
policy formulation nor a proper regulatory environment, a gap that could prove
risky. For example, Mogadishu’s acute land crisis is fuelled by poorly planned
investment exploiting local regulatory loopholes. One idea would be for the
Somali Economic Forum, a donor-funded organisation fostering private sector
development and economic growth, to use its upcoming conference in Dubai that
will bring together diverse stakeholders to help the new administration create
a rules-based regulatory environment to promote sensible investment.
Fostering peaceful federalism
Strengthening and broadening the fragile
administrations of federal member states should be a priority for the government
in order to stabilise areas far from Mogadishu. So far, the protracted and ad
hoc devolution of power from the weak FGS to federal states has resulted in de
facto blocs dominated by powerful clans which tend to monopolise power and
resources. Minority clans, including smaller sub-clans within major ones, often
feel sidelined, with dangerous implications: in Puntland, for example,
successive mutinies by security forces occurred in February and March over
unpaid wages, and several armed clan-based militias operate largely outside the
control of Puntland President Abdiweli Gaas. Equally problematic are increasing
Al-Shabaab attacks and targeted assassinations, as well as a growing, albeit
small, Islamic State faction operating in Puntland.
Elsewhere, the ousting of Galmudug Interim
Administration (GIA) President Abdikarim Guled by the state parliament has
created a power vacuum and elections planned for late March were postponed due
to the severe drought. A similar no confidence motion was initiated against Interim
South West Administration (ISWA) President Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan in March.
Pushing for genuine and viable political settlements at the intra- and
inter-federal state levels must remain a priority. To that end, the FGS and
international actors should focus on the following:
- Setting
up a permanent mechanism to help resolve disputes among federal states,
such as Puntland, Galmudug Interim Administration, Juba Interim Authority
and Interim South West Administration. In so doing, the government in
Mogadishu and state presidents would address the reality that several
inter-state borders are contested and, in almost all states, minority
clans feel aggrieved by local power sharing, with the risk that such
discontent could trigger wider violence within and between states;
- Supporting
the Independent Boundaries Review Commission (IBRC) to first demarcate
contested state borders and then define their boundaries more generally;
- Supporting
efforts to finalise currently vague and unaddressed issues in the
provisional constitution, including especially by clarifying legislation
on resource and power sharing among federal states and the FGS;
- Supporting
constructive dialogue between Somaliland, which continues to seek
independence, and the FGS. In this respect, Somaliland’s agreement with
the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to manage Berbera port and host a military
base is likely to exacerbate simmering tensions between Somaliland and the
FGS.
Security after AMISOM?
Al-Shabaab remains a resilient force that undertakes
suicide bombings, targeted assassinations, ambushes and sweeps across
south-central Somalia. After AMISOM played a key role in pushing Al-Shabaab’s
conventional forces from most urban centres, most troop contributing countries
(TCCs) are seeking to depart; at a March meeting in Nairobi, the TCCs began
crafting a plan for the mission’s drawdown. AMISOM Commander General Soubagleh
now says the withdrawal could start as early as 2018. But to make this
possible, the FGS and federal states will need to improve governance
dramatically and end local conflicts in liberated areas.
Indeed, without a clearer and more
institutionalised division of power, resources and security responsibilities
between the FGS and federal states, as well as among federal state administrations,
current security gains against Al-Shabaab will be difficult to sustain. In
addition, the plan to draw down AMISOM needs a coherent framework to establish
a sustainable national force that can take over responsibility for security and
mitigate the negative effects of regional competition. The new administration’s
further development of a national security architecture is a positive step, but
the roles and responsibilities of the National Security Council and the
president, notably in terms of command and control authority, will need to be
clarified and institutionalised. Moreover, efforts to build the Somali National
Army (SNA) could be improved through much better international coordination
among the EU, U.S., UK, Turkey and Gulf states, which are all involved in troop
training. There are growing indications that the U.S., under the Trump
administration, is determined to up its direct military involvement. This
carries risks. Although enhanced training and equipment would help, increased
airstrikes could inflame public opinion and unwittingly drive communities into
Al-Shabaab’s arms – especially if they cause civilian deaths.
Pursuing electoral reform
Somalia still has a long way to go before
shifting from the 4.5 quota system to one-person-one-vote elections; in
particular, it is unlikely that the requisite level of security will be
achieved in the next four years. Recent elections were also marred by lack of
transparency and accountability, which generated both corruption and electoral
manipulation. Therefore, rather than focusing on the overly ambitious goal of
one-person-one-vote, the London Conference ought to consider some of the
inherited challenges, principally the 4.5 clan system. In particular, Somalis
and international actors should:
- Encourage
the FGS to finalise the process of establishing functioning political
parties;
- Provide
technical support to register citizens across the country;
- Strengthen
the capacity of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) to organise and
oversee future elections; and
- Help
the IEC organise smaller scale (eg municipal) elections.
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