Trump's counterterror programme
How Trump will make
Obama's Countering Violent Extremism programme into "Countering Violent
Jihad".
Demonstrators hold signs during a
protest against Donald Trump and in support of Muslims residents in downtown
Hamtramck, Michigan [Reuters]
by
Khaled A Beydoun is an
associate professor of law at the University of Detroit Mercy School of Law.
On January 21, one day after US President Donald Trump was sworn
into office, the resistance was inaugurated by way of women's marches across the country. Muslim-Americans were
prominent in these marches, with civil rights leaders such as Linda Sarsour organising and addressing the
Washington, DC, crowd, and Muslim American women leading offshoot marches. The
ubiquitous displays of non-Muslims chanting slogans and holding signs in
defence of Muslims was heart-warming.
As Muslim women and men marched, however,
the looming perils of Trump's counterterror programme - still largely undefined
- raced through their minds. The day before, during his inauguration speech,
Trump vowed to completely eradicate "radical Islamic terrorism … from the
face of the earth".
Trump is inheriting from President Barack Obama the Countering
Violent Extremism (CVE) programme, that was based on the premise that foreign
terror threats are tied to Muslim American citizens at home. Like other
policies of the Obama administration, this programme was linked to the idea
that radicalisation is an exclusively Muslim phenomenon.
Trump has adopted this idea, but unlike the Obama administration,
he aims to integrate this conflation of radicalisation and Islam with the
belief that the US is interlocked in a war with Islam - and with the eight
million American citizens that adhere to it.
Exit Obama and Countering Violent Extremism. Enter Trump and war
of civilisations.
Counter-radicalisation from Obama to Trump
In 2011, Obama formally instituted counter-radicalisation as his
administration's signature counterterror programme CVE. It was a major
departure from the George W Bush's counterterror programme in three important
ways.
First, it shifted its concern from foreign terrorists to the
"homegrown violent extremists",
focusing on Muslim residents and citizens as suspect radicals. Second, CVE
relied on a network of informants to monitor subjects of interest within Muslim
communities, institutions, and public spaces, in addition to the electronic
surveillance model established under Bush. And third, Obama strategically
toned down the "clash of civilisations" rhetoric that characterised
the Bush administration, in exchange for the language of tolerance that helped in
the grooming of Muslim informants.
In five years, Obama built a
counter-radicalisation infrastructure and institutionalised the presumption
that radicalisation is a purely Muslim phenomenon. The structures and strategy
has now been handed over to his successor, Trump, to build upon, as he
assembles a counterterror team.
In late December, a Trump administration insider told Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) officials that the new president was committed to
the counter-radicalisaton national security model. However, the racially
neutral CVE would likely be renamed to "Countering Violent
Jihad" or "Countering Radical Islam" making it fully transparent
that Muslims are the specific targets of this programme.
This renaming aligns with Trump's modus operandi of blatant
Islamophobia, but it also promotes the worldview that the US must commit itself
to an intractable civilisational war with Islam.
Several of the organisations awarded large grants by the Obama
administration, with reach into vulnerable Muslim American communities, are
financially bound to carry their counter-radicalisation initiatives under
President Trump.
|
Apart from mere rhetoric, Trump has surrounded himself with
cabinet members who subscribe to this world view. General Michael Flynn,
Trump's national security adviser, wrote that, "The countries and
movements that are trying to destroy us … are united by their hatred of the
democratic West and their conviction that dictatorship is superior." He also tweeted in February 2016 that "Fear of Muslims is
rational" and has referred to Islam as a "malignant cancer".
Jeff Sessions, Trump's nominee for attorney general, referred to Islam as a "toxic ideology".
Michael Pompeo, picked to lead the CIA, stated that Muslim American leaders that do not explicitly denounce acts
of terror - both in the US and beyond - are "potentially complicit".
CVE's Muslim-American connection
One would think that Trump's brazen Islamophobia would shrink the pool of Muslim American informants and
interlocutors that could carry his counter-radicalisation programme forward.
However, several of the organisations awarded large grants by the
Obama administration, with reach into vulnerable Muslim American communities,
are financially bound to carry their counter-radicalisation initiatives under
President Trump.
Therefore, these organisations will carry forward
programming in Muslim communities even under Trump's Countering
Violent Jihad strategy.
Such programming will expose Muslim Americans to the heightened
suspicion and hardline policing that Trump is sure to streamline in the coming
months.
Muslim organisations that have received CVE funding have
capitalised on their community's ignorance of counter-radicalisation for cash
and have endorsed the state baseline that radicalisation is specific to
Muslims.
Looking forward, unless these organisations divest themselves of
the CVE grants, they are functionally carrying out the Trump administration's
counterterror vision. Until such divestment occurs, community members must not
engage with or provide support to these organisations.
The continuous association of Muslim organisations with CVE
signals the existence of elements within the broader Muslim-American landscape
that will trade off the best interests of the community for their own, and
collaborate with the most nefarious administration for cash.
As Trump's counter-radicalisation programme takes shape, displays
of solidarity with Muslims will be most needed within Muslim-American
communities: in mosques, community centres, student organisations, and
households, where the threat of counter-radicalisation will descend with
unprecedented intrusion and unseen ferocity.
Khaled A Beydoun is an assistant
professor of law at the Barry University Dwayne O Andreas School of Law. He is
a native of Detroit.
The views expressed in this article are
the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.
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